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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Can an Employee Who Applies
for Social Security Disability Benefits
Be a "Qualified Individual With a Disability"
Under the ADA?
By Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 263-266. © 1999 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is a professor
of law at Marquette University Law
School, P.O. Box 1881, Milwaukee,
WI 53201-1881; (414) 288-5377
or jgrenig@earthlink.net.
He is the co-author of West's
Handbook of Federal Civil
Discovery and Disclosure.
ISSUES
Does a person's application for or
receipt of disability benefits under
the Social Security Act create a
rebuttable presumption that the
person may not assert that he or
she is a "qualified individual with a
disability" under the Americans
with Disabilities Act? If the applica-
tion for or receipt of disability bene-
fits does not create such a presump-
tion, what weight should be given to
the application for or receipt of dis-
ability insurance benefits when a
person asserts that he or she is a
"qualified individual with a disabili-
ty" under the Americans with
Disabilities Act?
FACTS
Policy Management Systems Corp.
("PMSC") hired Carolyn Cleveland
in August 1993. The following
January, Cleveland suffered a stroke
while on the job and took a leave of
absence. As a result of the stroke,
Cleveland suffered a condition
known as aphasia. Aphasia is a dis-
order involving the cognitive input
and output of language. Aphasia
impairs memory, reading ability,
calculation ability, and the under-
standing and processing of language.
Cleveland's memory was impaired,
as were her abilities to speak and to
concentrate. Additionally, Cleveland
was unable to read or dial a tele-
phone and had trouble understand-
ing most of what was said to her.
With her daughter's assistance,
Cleveland filed an application for
Social Security disability benefits.
In support of her sworn application,
Cleveland certified that she had
become "unable to work because of
[her] disabling condition on January
7, 1994" and that she was "still
disabled."







FROM: THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
In April 1994, Cleveland's doctor
released her to return to work antic-
ipating an eventual and nearly full
recovery. Cleveland returned to
work for PMSC that April on a part-
time basis. Cleveland alleges that
when she returned to work she con-
tacted the Social Security Admini-
stration ("SSA") and informed it
that she had returned to work and
that she no longer needed disability
benefits. PMSC concedes that
Cleveland informed the SSA of her
return but denies that she ever
withdrew her application for disabil-
ity benefits or otherwise indicated
that she was anything other than
totally disabled.
Cleveland worked part-time for
about two weeks and then began
working full-time. She requested
several accommodations, including
computer training, permission to
take work home in the evenings, a
transfer of position, and permission
for the Texas Rehabilitation
Commission to provide a free coun-
selor to assist her. PMSC denied
each of Cleveland's requests. In July
1994, PMSC terminated Cleveland
for poor job performance.
In September 1994, Cleveland
renewed her application for Social
Security disability benefits by filing
a "Request for Reconsideration,"
stating "I continue to be disabled,"
and a "Work Activity Report" in
which she stated that she was ter-
minated "because I could no longer
do the job because of my condi-
tion." In January 1995, Cleveland
filed another "Request for
Reconsideration," and in May, she
requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge ("AL").
In both instances, Cleveland repre-
sented that she was "unable to work
due to my disability."
In September 1995, the ALJ deter-
mined that Cleveland had become
disabled on January 7, 1994, and
was disabled continuously through
the date of the AL's decision. The
ALJ granted Cleveland the Social
Security disability benefits she
requested, retroactive to January 1,
1994.
One week before the AL's decision,
Cleveland filed suit against PMSC in
U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Texas claiming wrongful
termination in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.) ("ADA") and
the Texas Labor Code. PMSC moved
for partial summary judgment,
asserting that Cleveland could not
establish a prima facie case under
the ADA because Cleveland's appli-
cation for and receipt of Social
Security disability benefits estopped
her from claiming that she is a
"qualified individual with a disabili-
ty." The district court granted
PMSC's motion on Cleveland's ADA
claim.
Cleveland appealed the decision to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, arguing that she is not
estopped from establishing as a mat-
ter of law that she is a "qualified
individual with a disability." The
court of appeals affirmed the district
court's decision, holding that
Cleveland was judicially estopped
from claiming that she was a "quali-
fied individual with a disability."
120 F.3d 513 (5th Cir. 1997). The
Fifth Circuit relied on Cleveland's
sworn statements to the SSA that
she was disabled. According to the
court, Cleveland "continuously and
unequivocally represented to the
SSA that she is totally disabled and
completely unable to work." The
United States Supreme Court
granted Cleveland's petition for
certiorari.
CASE ANALYSIS
The ADA prohibits an employer
from discriminating against "a quali.
fied individual with a disability
because of the disability." To assert
an ADA violation successfully in the
absence of direct evidence of dis-
crimination, a plaintiff must first
make a "prima facie" showing that
the plaintiff is a "qualified individual
with a disability." A "disability" is a
"physical or mental impairment thai
substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities" of the indi-
vidual. A "qualified individual with a
disability" is a "an individual with a
disability who, with or without rea-
sonable accommodation, can per-
form the essential functions" of the
individual's job.
The Social Security Act prescribes
an individual's eligibility for Social
Security disability benefits. An indi-
vidual is eligible for disability bene-
fits if he or she is unable "to engag4
in any substantial gainful activity by
reason of any medically deter-
minable physical or mental impair-
ment." The impairment must be of
such severity that the individual is
unable to do his or her previous
work and cannot engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful
work in the "national academy."
The Fifth Circuit stopped short of
adopting a per se rule that automati-
cally estops an employee who
applies for or receives Social
Security disability benefits from
asserting a claim of discrimination
under the ADA. The court acknowl-
edged that it is at least theoretically
conceivable that under some limited
and highly unusual set of circum-
stances the two claims would not
necessarily be mutually exclusive.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit held
that the application for or the
receipt of Social Security disability
benefits creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that the claimant or recip-
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ient of such benefits is judicially
estopped from asserting that the
individual is a "qualified individual
with a disability."
Cleveland argues that imposing a
presumption of judicial estoppel
erroneously assumes that individu-
als who apply for Social Security
benefits and who also pursue their
rights under the ADA are making
inconsistent claims and thereby
compromising the integrity of the
judicial system. Rather than main-
taining the integrity of the courts,
Cleveland claims that the Fifth
Circuit's judicial estoppel presump-
tion precludes legitimate ADA
claims asserted by disabled individ-
uals who were doing nothing more
than exercising their rights under
two federal acts designed specifical-
ly to protect the disabled.
On the other hand, PMSC contends
that the Fifth Circuit's rebuttable
presumption/estoppel approach
allows a court to determine whether
an individual's statements to the
SSA are inconsistent with, or com-
plementary to, the "qualified indi-
vidual" requirement of the ADA.
Cleveland asserts that the weight to
be given statements made in con-
nection with an application for dis-
ability benefits should be no differ-
ent than the weight given to any
other evidence. PMSC suggests that,
when properly applied, the Fifth
Circuit's holding allows a Social
Security applicant or recipient the
opportunity to prove that her repre-
sentations to the SSA are not incon-
sistent with the ADA's threshold
requirement that she must be a
"qualified individual with a disabili-
ty" in order to seek its protection.
SIGNIFICANCE
Judicial estoppel prevents a party
from asserting a position in a legal
proceeding that is contrary to a
position previously taken by the
party in the same or some earlier
proceeding. The doctrine is intend-
ed to protect the integrity of the
judicial process.
The vast majority of courts have
declined to hold that an ADA plain-
tiff is judicially estopped from prov-
ing his or her ADA claim simply
because the employee has sought or
received Social Security disability
benefits. See, e.g., Griffith v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 135 F.3d 376 (6th
Cir. 1998); Weigel v. Target Stores,
122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997); Moore
v. Payless Shoe Source, Inc., 139
F.3d 1210 (8th Cir. 1998); Johnson
v. Oregon Dept. of Human
Resources Rehabilitation, 141 F.3d
1362 (9th Cir. 1998); Rascon v. U.S.
West Communications, Inc., 143
F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998);
Talavera v. School Bd. of Palm
Beach County, 129 F.3d 1214 (11th
Cir. 1997); Swanks v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Authority, 116
F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1997). These
courts generally take the position
that statements made in connection
with a Social Security disability
benefits application are to be con-
sidered on a case-by-case basis in
the context in which they were
made and that they should not be
given any more weight than any
other evidence.
The Third Circuit, however, has
held that an individual who claims
to be totally disabled for purposes of
receiving Social Security disability
benefits cannot then assert that he
or she is a "qualified individual with
a disability" for purposes of bringing
an ADA claim. See, e.g., McNemar
v. The Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d
610 (3d. Cir. 1998).
In Cleveland, the Fifth Circuit took
the position that the application for
or the receipt of Social Security dis-
ability benefits creates a rebuttable
presumption that the claimant or
recipient of such benefits is judicial-
ly estopped from asserting that the
individual is a "qualified individual
with a disability."
Both the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission and the
Social Security Administration have
determined that, although state-
ments made in applying for Social
Security disability benefits may be
relevant evidence in a subsequent
ADA suit, an application for or
receipt of benefits is not by itself
inconsistent with being a "qualified
individual with a disability" under
the ADA.
The purpose of the ADA is to pro-
vide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimina-
tion of discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities. The pur-
pose of the Social Security Act in
providing disability benefits is to
provide financial support to individ-
uals meeting the definition of "dis-
abled" without regard to whether a
workplace accommodation would
enable the applicant to perform a
specific job.
There are other significant differ-
ences between the ADA and the
Social Security Act. While the ADA
requires an individualized inquiry
into the ability of a particular per-
son to meet the requirements of a
particular position, the Social
Security Act relies on general pre-
sumptions about an individual's
ability to work. It treats some condi-
tions as presumptively disabling,
and if a claimant has an impairment
that is medically equivalent to one
of those listed impairments, the SSA
presumes-without considering
other factors-that the disorder is
so severe that it will prevent the
claimant from doing any substantial
gainful activity.
Additionally, the Social Security Act
does not consider whether the indi-
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vidual can work if he or she is pro-
vided with a "reasonable accommo-
dation." The Act recognizes that an
individual may be able to qualify as
"disabled" under the SSA and still
be able to work in a particular posi-
tion. Thus the SSA has a trial work
period that allows beneficiaries to
work for nine months while their
benefit entitlement and payment
levels remain unchanged. Similarly,
the SSA provides individuals who
return to work with benefits in any
month in which earnings fall below
a statutory level.
If the Supreme Court upholds the
Fifth Circuit's rebuttable presump-
tion test, disabled individuals will
essentially be forced to choose
between making an ADA claim and
seeking Social Security disability
benefits. It would likely increase the
number of disabled individuals
resorting to reliance on Social
Security disability benefits and
make it more difficult for them to
enjoy the protections of the ADA.
On the other hand, if the Court
rejects the Fifth Circuit's standard
and determines instead that a claim
for Social Security disability bene-
fits is not inconsistent with a valid
ADA claim, an applicant's sworn
representations to the SSA would
still be relevant to the determina-
tion of whether he or she is a "qual-
ified individual" under the ADA.
Specific factual assertions made in
support of an application for disabil-
ity benefits would be relevant to an
ADA action if those representations
were inconsistent with the specific
factual assertions made in support
of the ADA claim. Such a standard
would nevertheless make it easier
for disabled employees or applicants
for employment to invoke the pro-
tection of the ADA.
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